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WORLD POLITICS REVIEW
In the Trump Era, Vietnam Is Less Sure of Its Bet on U.S. Ties
Joshua Kurlantzick
Over the past five years, no country in Southeast Asia has challenged
China’s regional strategic ambitions more assertively than Vietnam.
Repeatedly standing up to Beijing’s aims in the South China Sea, Vietnam
has attempted to allow foreign oil exploration in disputed maritime
areas and, like China, built up the submerged reefs, small islets and
banks it occupies and added installations, though on a much smaller
scale. It has, at times, tried to work with its neighbors, such as the
Philippines under former President Benigno Aquino III, to highlight what
it sees as China’s illegal behavior in the South China Sea.
To push back against China, Vietnam built closer strategic ties with the
United States, too, moving so close that Hanoi appeared ready, before
2017, to possibly end its traditional approach of hedging between
Beijing and Washington. Hanoi and Washington established a comprehensive
partnership under the Obama administration, which lifted a ban on U.S.
arms sales to Vietnam and brought the two countries’ militaries closer
together.
In the first year of Donald Trump’s presidency, however, Vietnam has
appeared less sure of its bet on ties with the U.S., though it warmly
welcomed a visit by Secretary of Defense James Mattis last week. Hanoi
has also seemingly backed down a bit from its tough approach to China in
recent months.
Is Vietnam in the Trump era feeling the pressure of its giant neighbor’s
military power and sizable trade relationship with Hanoi? Perhaps, but
even if Hanoi thinks it cannot trust Washington’s long-term strategic
and trade commitment to Southeast Asia, it will not move much closer to
Beijing. Instead, Vietnam will find new ways to hedge and stake out its
own ambitions, working with other regional partners.
Vietnam’s turn toward a less openly
confrontational approach to China has been apparent since the middle of
last year. After initially offering
exploration rights in a disputed block in the South China Sea to Spain’s
Repsol, Hanoi chose to suspend drilling last year, reportedly after
pressure from Beijing. Then, last November, Vietnamese leaders put out a
cordial joint statement with their Chinese counterparts, with both
vowing to maintain peace in the South China Sea.
There are several reasons for this change of
attitude, and not all of them have to do with Trump. Under
President Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines has become a much less
reliable partner for Vietnam on South China Sea disputes. While the
Aquino administration brought a case against Beijing’s claims in the
South China Sea to an international tribunal, and publicly chastised
Beijing’s regional ambitions, Duterte has wooed China, played down the
tribunal ruling, reduced some Philippine-U.S. military exchanges and
generally conceded whenever China has publicly pressured him not to
assert the Philippines’ claims in the South China Sea. As chair of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2017, the Philippines did
little to focus the group on threats from China. Domestic political
challenges in Vietnam—most notably a high-profile crackdown on
corruption among the Vietnamese elite—may have also distracted Hanoi’s
leaders from foreign policy.
But shifts in U.S. policy probably played a
role in Vietnam’s milder approach to China.
Mattis and the Pentagon have pushed for a tougher line in the South
China Sea, especially through a regular schedule of freedom of
navigation operations. The operations have included sending a destroyer
near the disputed Scarborough Shoal shortly before Mattis’ visit to
Vietnam. The Pentagon has announced that it will send an aircraft
carrier to Vietnam for the first time since the end of the Vietnam War.
On his trip to Southeast Asia, Mattis further signaled a willingness to
call portions of the South China Sea by names assigned to them by
Southeast Asian states, like Indonesia, rather than by China.
Yet at the same time, Vietnamese officials
have been angered by the Trump administration’s trade rhetoric and
actions, which they worry could poison other aspects of the
U.S.-Vietnam relationship. In addition to pulling out of the
Trans-Pacific-Partnership—a deal that would enormously benefit Vietnam’s
economy—Trump delivered a protectionist speech at the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation summit in Danang last year in which he complained
about “unfair trade” and promoted his America First agenda. In December,
the Commerce Department imposed steep tariffs on certain types of steel
from Vietnam.
Vietnamese officials are generally unsure how
to read the Trump administration’s long-term approach to Southeast Asia,
especially with Washington focused—not unreasonably—on the Korean
Peninsula. They also don’t know how the White House’s interest in
reviving the so-called quad—a broader regional approach to the
Indo-Pacific with Japan, Australia and India—will play out and what
difference it might actually make in blunting China’s aggressive
approach to the South China Sea.
U.S.-Vietnam strategic relations, at the highest levels, will likely
remain strong for now, although Hanoi is not going to become as close a
U.S. partner as, say, Singapore, while tensions linger on trade. But
instead of moving back closer to China, Vietnam is diversifying its
efforts to blunt Beijing’s growing regional power.
For one, Hanoi is likely to work closely with Singapore, this year’s
ASEAN chair, to try to build consensus within the bloc on dealing with
Beijing. Singapore generally takes a much more hawkish approach to China
than the Philippines has under Duterte. With its highly skilled
diplomats, Singapore has long been an effective leader of ASEAN. If any
country can convince ASEAN states to come together and present a united
front in negotiating a potential code of conduct in the South China Sea
with Beijing, it is probably Singapore.
Vietnam is stepping up strategic ties with Singapore, and doing the same
with Japan, South Korea and Australia. Japan and Vietnam upgraded their
strategic partnership in 2014, and Tokyo is selling Hanoi patrol boats
and radar-based observation satellites. Vietnam has called on South
Korea to play a larger potential role in Southeast Asian regional
security, although Seoul has not responded with any clear intent.
Farther afield, Vietnam is trying to woo India to bolster its security,
even pushing for India’s navy to be more assertive in the South China
Sea. Earlier this month, Vietnam called on Indian companies to make new
investments in oil and gas in the South China Sea, which angered
Beijing.
On its own, Hanoi is shoring up its own features and military
capabilities in the South China Sea. Vietnam continues to undertake a
military modernization program, creating the largest submarine fleet in
Southeast Asia and upgrading its naval forces in many other ways.
With the void left by the U.S. pulling out of the TPP, Vietnam has
strongly supported Japan stepping in as a regional leader on trade.
Japan, backed by Hanoi and other TPP members, helped push a salvaged
deal forward, minus the U.S.; the deal, now called the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, was finalized last
week and is set to be signed in March.
Vietnam might have become more publicly accommodating of China this past
year, as it sought to understand the Trump administration’s policy in
Asia and dealt with schisms among its neighbors. But Hanoi will remain
the staunchest foe in Southeast Asia of China’s military ambitions, even
if it has to cultivate partners beyond Washington to protect itself. |