WORLD POLITICS REVIEW
29-1-18

 

In the Trump Era, Vietnam Is Less Sure of Its Bet on U.S. Ties

 

Joshua Kurlantzick

 

Over the past five years, no country in Southeast Asia has challenged China’s regional strategic ambitions more assertively than Vietnam. Repeatedly standing up to Beijing’s aims in the South China Sea, Vietnam has attempted to allow foreign oil exploration in disputed maritime areas and, like China, built up the submerged reefs, small islets and banks it occupies and added installations, though on a much smaller scale. It has, at times, tried to work with its neighbors, such as the Philippines under former President Benigno Aquino III, to highlight what it sees as China’s illegal behavior in the South China Sea.

 

To push back against China, Vietnam built closer strategic ties with the United States, too, moving so close that Hanoi appeared ready, before 2017, to possibly end its traditional approach of hedging between Beijing and Washington. Hanoi and Washington established a comprehensive partnership under the Obama administration, which lifted a ban on U.S. arms sales to Vietnam and brought the two countries’ militaries closer together.

 

In the first year of Donald Trump’s presidency, however, Vietnam has appeared less sure of its bet on ties with the U.S., though it warmly welcomed a visit by Secretary of Defense James Mattis last week. Hanoi has also seemingly backed down a bit from its tough approach to China in recent months.

 

Is Vietnam in the Trump era feeling the pressure of its giant neighbor’s military power and sizable trade relationship with Hanoi? Perhaps, but even if Hanoi thinks it cannot trust Washington’s long-term strategic and trade commitment to Southeast Asia, it will not move much closer to Beijing. Instead, Vietnam will find new ways to hedge and stake out its own ambitions, working with other regional partners.

 

Vietnam’s turn toward a less openly confrontational approach to China has been apparent since the middle of last year. After initially offering exploration rights in a disputed block in the South China Sea to Spain’s Repsol, Hanoi chose to suspend drilling last year, reportedly after pressure from Beijing. Then, last November, Vietnamese leaders put out a cordial joint statement with their Chinese counterparts, with both vowing to maintain peace in the South China Sea.

 

There are several reasons for this change of attitude, and not all of them have to do with Trump. Under President Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines has become a much less reliable partner for Vietnam on South China Sea disputes. While the Aquino administration brought a case against Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea to an international tribunal, and publicly chastised Beijing’s regional ambitions, Duterte has wooed China, played down the tribunal ruling, reduced some Philippine-U.S. military exchanges and generally conceded whenever China has publicly pressured him not to assert the Philippines’ claims in the South China Sea. As chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2017, the Philippines did little to focus the group on threats from China. Domestic political challenges in Vietnam—most notably a high-profile crackdown on corruption among the Vietnamese elite—may have also distracted Hanoi’s leaders from foreign policy.

 

But shifts in U.S. policy probably played a role in Vietnam’s milder approach to China. Mattis and the Pentagon have pushed for a tougher line in the South China Sea, especially through a regular schedule of freedom of navigation operations. The operations have included sending a destroyer near the disputed Scarborough Shoal shortly before Mattis’ visit to Vietnam. The Pentagon has announced that it will send an aircraft carrier to Vietnam for the first time since the end of the Vietnam War. On his trip to Southeast Asia, Mattis further signaled a willingness to call portions of the South China Sea by names assigned to them by Southeast Asian states, like Indonesia, rather than by China.

 

Yet at the same time, Vietnamese officials have been angered by the Trump administration’s trade rhetoric and actions, which they worry could poison other aspects of the U.S.-Vietnam relationship. In addition to pulling out of the Trans-Pacific-Partnership—a deal that would enormously benefit Vietnam’s economy—Trump delivered a protectionist speech at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Danang last year in which he complained about “unfair trade” and promoted his America First agenda. In December, the Commerce Department imposed steep tariffs on certain types of steel from Vietnam.

 

Vietnamese officials are generally unsure how to read the Trump administration’s long-term approach to Southeast Asia, especially with Washington focused—not unreasonably—on the Korean Peninsula. They also don’t know how the White House’s interest in reviving the so-called quad—a broader regional approach to the Indo-Pacific with Japan, Australia and India—will play out and what difference it might actually make in blunting China’s aggressive approach to the South China Sea.

 

U.S.-Vietnam strategic relations, at the highest levels, will likely remain strong for now, although Hanoi is not going to become as close a U.S. partner as, say, Singapore, while tensions linger on trade. But instead of moving back closer to China, Vietnam is diversifying its efforts to blunt Beijing’s growing regional power.

 

For one, Hanoi is likely to work closely with Singapore, this year’s ASEAN chair, to try to build consensus within the bloc on dealing with Beijing. Singapore generally takes a much more hawkish approach to China than the Philippines has under Duterte. With its highly skilled diplomats, Singapore has long been an effective leader of ASEAN. If any country can convince ASEAN states to come together and present a united front in negotiating a potential code of conduct in the South China Sea with Beijing, it is probably Singapore.

 

Vietnam is stepping up strategic ties with Singapore, and doing the same with Japan, South Korea and Australia. Japan and Vietnam upgraded their strategic partnership in 2014, and Tokyo is selling Hanoi patrol boats and radar-based observation satellites. Vietnam has called on South Korea to play a larger potential role in Southeast Asian regional security, although Seoul has not responded with any clear intent.

 

Farther afield, Vietnam is trying to woo India to bolster its security, even pushing for India’s navy to be more assertive in the South China Sea. Earlier this month, Vietnam called on Indian companies to make new investments in oil and gas in the South China Sea, which angered Beijing.

 

On its own, Hanoi is shoring up its own features and military capabilities in the South China Sea. Vietnam continues to undertake a military modernization program, creating the largest submarine fleet in Southeast Asia and upgrading its naval forces in many other ways.

 

With the void left by the U.S. pulling out of the TPP, Vietnam has strongly supported Japan stepping in as a regional leader on trade. Japan, backed by Hanoi and other TPP members, helped push a salvaged deal forward, minus the U.S.; the deal, now called the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, was finalized last week and is set to be signed in March.

 

Vietnam might have become more publicly accommodating of China this past year, as it sought to understand the Trump administration’s policy in Asia and dealt with schisms among its neighbors. But Hanoi will remain the staunchest foe in Southeast Asia of China’s military ambitions, even if it has to cultivate partners beyond Washington to protect itself.

 

Joshua Kurlantzick is senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations