Scholars who
claim to know with any certainty how
U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s
foreign policy will crystalize are engaging
in tenuous prophecy. As they and the United
States’ international partners strain to
determine the contours of his plans,
however, there are at least
two
groups of source material on which they can
draw. The first is Trump’s statements on
foreign policy during his campaign; the
second is the writings of his closest
national security advisers.
When it comes
to the president-elect’s approach to Asia,
these two sets of evidence point in
different directions: one toward
retrenchment and the other toward
unilateralism. Yet these divergent
visions have something important in common.
Neither calls for a foreign policy centered
around the system of alliances, rules, and
norms that have underpinned the United
States’ leadership of
the international order since 1945.
Together with the deep uncertainty
surrounding Trump’s objectives for Asia and
the tools he has suggested he will use to
pursue them, the absence of principled and
predictable U.S. leadership could lead to a
destabilizing shift in the regional balance
of power in the near term.
READING
THE TEA LEAVES
Foreign
policy, particularly as it relates to Asia,
played a relatively minor role in Trump’s
presidential campaign. When the topic of
U.S. policy toward Asia did arise, Trump
tended to use the opportunity to underscore
the “America first” worldview he adopted
from the
isolationist Charles Lindberg, railing
against trade deals and promising economic
retaliation against those who subvert U.S.
interests. Indeed, during his candidacy,
Trump appeared to see Asian states mostly
through an economic lens, often as
rule-breakers deserving punishment.
Like Hillary
Clinton, Trump opposed the Trans-Pacific
Partnership during his campaign. But he also
assailed
free trade deals more broadly,
vowing to upend a number of the United
States’ international economic ties. Trump
promised to label China a currency
manipulator during his first 100 days in
office—a threat that may not carry
meaningful consequences and is also
outdated, since Beijing now keeps its
currency
artificially high. More troubling is
Trump’s pledge to impose a 45 percent tariff
on Chinese imports. Such a policy would
start a trade war, lead to a massive
recession, eliminate millions of U.S.
jobs, and damage the economies of some
close U.S. allies, including Japan and
South Korea. Trump’s campaign advisers have
since
scaled back the size of the proposed
tariff, but none have attempted to unwind it
completely.
When
it comes to security issues in Asia, Trump
does not appear to have well-developed views
but has consistently favored economic
punishment as a foreign-policy tool.
He has said that U.S. trade policy could
force China to retreat in the South
China Sea and has
argued that the United States should use
economic leverage to pressure China to rein
in North Korea—a “problem” that
he has said Beijing could solve “with
one phone call.” Trump appears to believe
that his support for a tariff on Chinese
goods comports with his hopes for
improved relations with Beijing.
Trump has displayed deep antipathy toward
longstanding U.S. commitments in Asia,
including those to nuclear nonproliferation
(he has
effectively encouraged Japan and South
Korea to pursue
nuclear weapons of their own) and the
security of regional allies. On several
occasions,
he has called on Japan and South Korea
to
pay the full cost of the U.S. military’s
deployments within their borders, stating
that if they failed to do so, the United
States could draw down its troops. Concerns
about
burden-sharing in U.S. alliances are
nothing new, but Trump’s criticisms have
worried the United States’ Asian allies
because of what they betray: Trump was
apparently unaware of the fact that Japan
and South Korea are the least expensive
places in the world (including the United
States) to base U.S. forces because of Tokyo
and Seoul’s financial contributions; he
demonstrated no interest in the economic and
strategic value the United States’
relationships with those countries bestow;
and he did not appear to respect U.S. allies
enough to discuss burden-sharing privately
after the election instead of publicly
during the campaign.
In short,
Trump’s Asia policy reflected a startling
mélange of neo-isolationism and neo-Jacksonianism,
along with a nearly doctrinal devotion to
unpredictability and a tendency to favor
economic punishment as a foreign-policy
tool. Trump’s closest Asia advisers,
however, appear to endorse a starkly
different approach.
THE
COMPANY TRUMP KEEPS
The
president-elect’s
Asia advisers have tended to be
deeply
suspicious of China and have supported a
muscular, unilateral U.S. foreign policy in
the region. Writing the day before the
election in
Foreign Policy, Alex Grey and
Peter Navarro, both Trump advisers,
articulated their candidate’s vision for
Asia—one they likened to Ronald Reagan’s
appeal for “peace through strength.” They
called for an end to the defense budget
sequester, a massive expansion of the U.S.
Navy to 350 ships, and a stronger military
presence in Asia than the current
administration has provided under its
“rebalance” to the region. Grey and Navarro
reiterated Trump’s skepticism toward
international trade’s central role in U.S.
foreign policy and made clear that U.S.
allies would “respectfully” be asked to pay
more for their defense. In a departure from
Trump’s penchant for retrenchment, however,
they offered a primacist’s vision for the
United States' presence in the Asia–Pacific,
by which Washington’s sustained military
preponderance would limit the apparent
threats posed by China.
Since the
election, Trump has spoken by phone with
South Korean President Park Geun-hye and
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and has
reiterated the United States’ defense
commitments to South Korea and Japan. (He
also met with Abe in New York on November
17.) Those conversations appear to have
proceeded smoothly. The real question for
the United States’ treaty allies, however,
is not whether Trump will abrogate
Washington’s security commitments; that
would be met with intense opposition from
Congress, the military, and civil servants
and is unlikely. Instead, the question is
whether Trump will drain U.S. alliances of
their meaning by reducing the United States’
cooperation with its partners to the extent
that they feel they have been abandoned.
Trump’s
first phone call with Chinese President Xi
Jinping, on November 14, also left much
unanswered. The two leaders
pledged to cooperate and strengthen
ties, but the president-elect’s campaign
positions have probably left the Chinese
wary. Taken together with Trump’s skepticism
of U.S. alliances, these overtures to China
give Washington’s Asian allies reason to
fear that the next U.S. president might
pursue a great power condominium with
Beijing: a kind of G2 arrangement in which
the interests of smaller states would be
circumvented or discarded. Trump’s penchant
for China-bashing and his advisers’ embrace
of unilateralism may make this seem
unlikely, but there is no reason why the
Trump administration could not punish China
economically and build up the United States’
military presence in the region while also
ceding the initiative on a number of
security issues to Beijing. Of course, Trump
may change his positions on China and U.S.
alliances once he takes office. But even if
a full-blown U.S.–China condominium is
unlikely in practice, the fact that U.S.
allies have reason to fear one matters a
great deal. It suggests that Trump’s
mercurial statements have already damaged
the United States’ credibility.
ASIA AS
AFTERTHOUGHT?
As a number
of
foreign-policy scholars have noted,
it will probably take months for the new
administration to develop a strategy for
Asia. Given Trump’s devotion to
unpredictability, he might not craft such a
strategy at all: he could instead pick and
choose from a neo-Jacksonian, unilateralist
buffet, deciding what “America first” means
as circumstances change.
If the
positive features of Trump’s vision for Asia
are still unclear, its gaps are obvious. The
statements of Trump and his advisers have
not mentioned international institutions
such as the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) or the Asia–Pacific Economic
Cooperation forum, nor have they raised
human rights or the rule of law as foreign
policy principles. Trump and his advisers
have offered scant indication that they
believe U.S. alliances are more than
transactional or that the United States
should cooperate closely with
Asian states instead of periodically
thrusting itself on the region as its
interests dictate. In short, the
president-elect and his advisers have given
few signs that they intend to play a
constructive role in the
international order: the web of
treaties, regimes, norms, and laws that the
United States has helped build since 1945.
If traditional conservatives end up filling
enough posts in the Trump administration,
they may help ameliorate this deficit. But
that would not change the fact that for the
first time since 1945, the U.S.
president-elect appears to have little
interest in making positive contributions to
the system that has sustained the United
States’ global leadership.
If the
United States fails to uphold the
international order, it could trigger
several adverse developments in the balance
of power in Asia. First, countries that have
partnered with the United States but also
maintain close ties to China may tilt toward
Beijing. This tendency is likely to be
strongest in Southeast Asia, where many
states hope to reap more benefits from their
economic ties with China; Malaysia and the
Philippines have already begun to follow
this logic. The states that comprise ASEAN
might conclude that Washington is
retrenching diplomatically and
institutionally, if not militarily, and
cease to stand up to China on issues such as
island-building and the development of a
code of conduct for the
South China Sea. The United States could
thus lose the political partners its
upgraded military would have the power to
protect.
Given their
longstanding reliance on U.S. security
commitments, Washington’s treaty allies will
likely cautiously cooperate with the next
administration. As the details of Trump’s
approach to U.S. alliances become more
clear, they may choose to increase their
security independence, ramping up their
defense spending and military cooperation
with one another. They may also try to plug
some of the holes left by the United States’
diminished role in areas such as security
assistance to Southeast Asian states. Even
if Trump assiduously courts longstanding
U.S. treaty allies, however, he faces an
uphill battle: the damage done by his and
his advisers’ critical statements and
endorsements of unilateralism and
unpredictability will not be easy to repair.
The best hope for China
is that the president-elect will prove to be as
transactional as he suggested he would be during the
campaign, willing to back away from U.S. partnerships
and cut deals with Beijing. The worst case is that Trump
will advance unpredictable military policies and
vengeful economic ones, triggering instability in the
region. China
will certainly continue its own military buildup and
seek to consolidate its recent political gains in its
relationships with Malaysia, the Philippines, and other
regional states. But it is unlikely to take provocative
actions in the early days of Trump’s administration—by,
for example, declaring an air-defense identification
zone or seizing another reef in the
South China Sea—so long as the prospect of a
punishing response from Washington acts as a short-term
deterrent. Beijing will probably carefully assess the
new administration before making any moves.
Although the concrete
details of Trump’s strategy for Asia are scant, a few
things seem clear. An uncertain future awaits a region
that has become accustomed to principled and mostly
predictable U.S. leadership. In this new environment,
friends and challengers alike should not be blamed for
concluding that they cannot count on Washington as they
have in the past. The United States’ allies should
prepare to take tough stands against U.S. policies when
necessary and to hold Washington accountable for its
commitments. Internationalists in both political parties
will seek to reassure the United States’ partners of its
continued commitment, but Trump’s rise and stunning
victory tell a different story.
There is a painful irony
to be found in the likely consequences of Trump’s
election for Asia. The
Obama administration’s rebalance, despite its flaws,
sought to demonstrate to the region that China’s rise
did not spell U.S. decline. Trump’s victory and his
team’s embryonic “America first” foreign policy could
convince Asian states to give up on Washington.
But these remain
no more than informed prognostications at a moment of
epochal political upheaval. One hopes that they are
incorrect: Asia is too important to the United States,
and the United States to Asia, for it to be otherwise.