FOREIGN AFFAIRS
22-11-16

Deciphering Trump's Asia Policy

What "America First" Will Mean for Regional Order

The best hope for China is that the president-elect will prove to be as transactional as he suggested he would be during the campaign, willing to back away from U.S. partnerships and cut deals with Beijing. The worst case is that Trump will advance unpredictable military policies and vengeful economic ones, triggering instability in the region. China will certainly continue its own military buildup and seek to consolidate its recent political gains in its relationships with Malaysia, the Philippines, and other regional states. But it is unlikely to take provocative actions in the early days of Trump’s administration—by, for example, declaring an air-defense identification zone or seizing another reef in the South China Sea—so long as the prospect of a punishing response from Washington acts as a short-term deterrent. Beijing will probably carefully assess the new administration before making any moves.

Although the concrete details of Trump’s strategy for Asia are scant, a few things seem clear. An uncertain future awaits a region that has become accustomed to principled and mostly predictable U.S. leadership. In this new environment, friends and challengers alike should not be blamed for concluding that they cannot count on Washington as they have in the past. The United States’ allies should prepare to take tough stands against U.S. policies when necessary and to hold Washington accountable for its commitments. Internationalists in both political parties will seek to reassure the United States’ partners of its continued commitment, but Trump’s rise and stunning victory tell a different story.

There is a painful irony to be found in the likely consequences of Trump’s election for Asia. The Obama administration’s rebalance, despite its flaws, sought to demonstrate to the region that China’s rise did not spell U.S. decline. Trump’s victory and his team’s embryonic “America first” foreign policy could convince Asian states to give up on Washington. But these remain no more than informed prognostications at a moment of epochal political upheaval. One hopes that they are incorrect: Asia is too important to the United States, and the United States to Asia, for it to be otherwise.