



Playing football in Vietnam before 1940: an act of resistance?

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ABSTRACT

Studies about Vietnam are numerous but there is very little contemporary scholarship about the relationship between football and politics. The role of football, the most popular sport, was particularly important in both creating a new local elite and challenging French colonization, and preparing the way for independence.

Introduction

In 1910 one colonial newspaper in Saigon welcomed the first Annamite football team¹; but fifteen years later the French colonial administration was uneasy at the existence of anti-colonial activities during some football games.² Against overwhelming odds such as military conquest and the process of ‘pacification’, nationalism had survived in Vietnam thanks to the character of its people and their commitment to football. Between 1910 and 1925 some members of the Annamite elite played football simply for pleasure, but in addition to this first group I should cite two others with different motives for playing football. On the one hand, some chose this as a way in which to improve their own living conditions without challenging French domination, while on the other, a section of the elite wished to work for the entire Vietnamese people and used football to prepare an ambitious project: to plan for independence.

I suggest that the game of football played a key role for some segments of the local population who sought to modernize the society and remove colonial domination as quickly as possible. Surprising as it may sound, playing football became one of the most important factors visible in the preparation for independence in Indochina. Yet the role of this activity is underestimated, in my opinion, and remains unnoticed by the general public. This view may be the consequence of dealing with an area of scholarship on which very little work has been done.³

In this article I address this gap in research on nationalism in Vietnam⁴: firstly, by analysing one administrative division in Cochinchina in 1925, which witnessed the first step towards independence, and secondly by studying the action of members of the radical elite who grasped the opportunity to promote their project through sport.

Methodology

I visited the archives centres in Vietnam (Dalat, Hanoi, Hô Chi Minh City) as well as French establishments such as the French *Bibliothèque nationale* (National Library), the *École française d’Extrême Orient* (The Far East French School) and the *Musée de la Guerre* (The War Museum) in Paris, the *Centre d’archives d’outre-mer* (The Overseas Archive Centre) in Aix-en-Provence and Dinan library. In addition to the documents collected from these places, I met many witnesses, both Vietnamese and French, who told me their own histories and expressed their views on politics and

football at that time. As the reader will see, they had differing points of view, apparent mainly in comparison to what they said to the newspapers or what was mentioned in administrative documents.

Supporters or partisans?

An Annamite football club penalized

In January 1925 two football teams played a friendly match in Saigon – the ‘Star of Giadinh’, the most famous Annamite team at that time because of its victory in the local championship in 1917 versus ‘Taberd Sport’, an association of young people including Annamites, French and some *Metis* (mixed race) children.⁵ As this match took place at the football ground of Le Cercle Sportif Saigonnais, most of the attendance consisted of French colonials, who tended to oppose the ‘Star of Giadinh’. This fact is important and helps explain why this ordinary event triggered a major colonial crisis in Cochinchina.

Ten minutes before the end of the match, the players of the ‘Star of Giadinh’ were threatened with disqualification by Breton, the French president of the ‘Cochinchina Athletics Sport Federation’, who accused them of being violent. The Annamite supporters immediately invaded the field to demonstrate their protest. Each side made threats to the other and the Annamite Captain, Thi Paul, was insulted by Breton and expelled from the pitch.⁶ Thi Paul and his team left the ground, surrounded and encouraged by the Annamite crowd. For the Annamite supporters, nothing could explain this French decision except racist arguments against the ‘Star of Giadinh’. According to a number of Annamites, this incident prevented the Annamite team from winning the match and gaining greater prestige.

This local event was very quickly turned into an immense crisis in Cochinchina because of the parties involved. It set the French president of the sports federation, well-known to all the colonials and Annamites who loved sporting activities, in direct opposition to the most skilful Annamite footballer, and this could be seen as a typical case of segregation or racism in sport. It was obvious to the Annamite people that Breton and other settlers refused to see the ‘Star of Giadinh’ in the same way as any other team. Thi Paul had no difficulty convincing the players and the crowd of the need to protest against Breton’s decision. In addition, many newspapers were following this case and most of them chose their sides. Very quickly, therefore, sports articles appeared on the front page, like politics, and the two audiences, French and Annamite, showed great interest in this issue. One Annamite newspaper used the expression ‘French jingoism’ to qualify Breton’s decision⁷; and some French newspapers reported on what they saw as ‘Annamite nationalism’.

Some days later, the federal commission decided to suspend Thi Paul for twelve months. It was an extremely serious sanction for him, and his club wanted to leave the ‘Cochinchina Athletic Sporting Federation’ because it could not challenge the Federation’s decision. The Federation agreed immediately but at that specific moment no one could imagine how the other Annamite clubs would react. The Federation and its leader, Breton, stated that this could have been an opportunity to ban some violent Annamite footballers. Breton thought that the sanction was related to one player, the captain of the Annamite team, who refused to accept his decision and told his comrades to leave the field. Breton and Thi Paul both believed that they were in the right position. For the French president of the Federation, the principle that must prevail was that no player was entitled to challenge what he said: in other words, when the president ordered, everyone must obey.

But this incident led to vehement opposition between two different national entities: the dominant French community and the Annamites who were supposed to be under compulsion to respect the French rules. Moreover, people who were directly affected by this sanction belonged to the urban elite, whose words and actions were followed by the rest of the Annamite population who did not accept the sight of the Annamites under threat, as happened to Paul Thi.

And worse was to come for Thi Paul and his team when some colonial newspapers mocked the Annamite football clubs, saying that they were too poor to develop activities on their own and were unable to educate their players. Articles of this kind widened the gap between these two communities. Very clearly this exclusion ran the risk making the French settlers' disdain and discrimination for the Vietnamese apparent thereby transforming football as the symbol of anti-French sentiments. Further, this could have provoked clashes in the colony because almost the whole of the Annamite community supported the 'Star of Giadinh' and appeared to dislike the French citizens.

Popular nationalism joins the new members of the elite

All the Annamite football clubs immediately left the 'Cochinchina Athletic Sporting Federation' in protest against this sanction. So two competing federations now began to exist: each had its own championship and its own heroes. The first, the 'Cochinchina Athletic Sporting Federation', brought sixteen clubs into the 'Cochinchina Championship'; the second one was called the 'Annamite Intersports Commission' with a membership of twelve clubs⁸ whose players were students, employees in the civil service or men from liberal professions.

The Annamite organizers now had to govern their clubs without French help and, significantly, without French subsidies. But this was not impossible to resolve, and the clubs raised funds by organizing theatrical performances or through contributions from the wealthiest Annamite people in Cochinchina. In this way the 'Star of Giadinh' was able to have the best Annamite stadium; but many local football teams had no field to play on and had to share a single pitch among several clubs. Furthermore, almost all the Annamite supporters followed their teams and refused to attend football grounds used by French teams. In fact there were many hundreds or thousands of people who came to applaud the Annamite clubs and very few continued to support the French clubs apart from the colonial population.

The crisis also increased the prestige of the 'Star of Giadinh' throughout Cochinchina, and in Cambodia where the Annamite communities wanted it to come so that they could play against this famous football team. In a few weeks in 1925, this team helped to restore dignity among the Annamites, who now took great pride in being able to govern themselves without the colonizers at least in the arena of sport. Thus the leaders of these clubs came to be followed by young people and adults, who were in turn engaged in the process of building a vibrant and prosperous society.

Football and homeland in Cochinchina

The action of Annamite clubs succeeded in creating a national drive stronger than the achievements of 'Young Annam', a moderate political movement. Almost all the Annamite members of the Colonial Council belonged to this 'Young Annam' but they were unable to bring so many people together. Whereas the Annamite people had neither the right to vote (apart from a very few citizens) nor the right of association and demonstration, they found a good substitute in supporting their football clubs. After 1925 every game with Giadinh was an opportunity to rally together for a common cause: pride in belonging to the Annamite people. Since the French conquest there had been little opportunity to show it but it now became possible as a result of this physical activity. Firstly because Annamite people could learn to play football and win matches as well as the French; secondly because some Annamite club leaders were well able to manage this and create a dynamic federation.

So after this administrative autonomy effected in 1925, most Annamite football players had their own teams, their supporters and their sponsors. This sporting transformation provided the means to forge a new social unity among Annamite people, above all for the youngest ones. The new administrative autonomy enabled the Annamite associations to build numerous teams and attract younger players who were keen to use this sport to demonstrate their national feelings. These young

Annamite people were influenced by Nguyen An Ninh, who wrote that ‘the redemption of the country now depended on the young, individually and collectively.’ Most importantly, he insisted, the youth of the nation had to act. ‘Life is action’, he wrote. ‘To say action is to say effort. To say effort is to say obstacles. And they are many, the obstacles to our ambitions, the greatest of them being ourselves.’⁹ Having read many administrative files on Annamite clubs and numerous newspaper articles, I think that playing football was the answer to this demand. It meant that this sporting activity was popular not only for the good health of the players but also to build a better future for the country. As Ninh had travelled in Europe some years earlier, he saw that the young people of the leading nations not only enjoyed playing sport but pursued it with passion. In Vietnam main sporting activities were essentially tennis and football but the latter was the only one to attract so many active participants and large crowds. A number of new football clubs had appeared by the end of the World War I, and their new members belonged to the 5,000 French-speaking educated Annamites, many of whom also had political ambitions. In other words, they sought to use football as a cultural weapon in the struggle for independence. They read Ninh’s articles and were less moderate than older people who belonged to ‘Young Annam’. Ten years earlier, most Vietnamese reformers supported the war effort in the hope that the colonizers would have to make good on their promises of political and social reform.¹⁰ But even by 1925 nothing happened and the youth of the nation began to think differently.

As nothing changed as a result of Sarraut’s Franco-Vietnamese collaboration, the Annamites made use of cultural ways to modernize their society and press for independence without delay. The Annamite youth forged new ideals, new culture compared to the Confucian tradition: in this way, young people refused to keep quiet like the mandarins, the former elite members who were unable to avoid the French occupation. Thanks to football some individuals became physically stronger than the older generation and, year after year, these players became increasingly numerous. This generation who spoke French and played football came to constitute a new political force, determined to take responsibility and action to forge an independent country. Their physical skills generated greater confidence in their ability to fight for freedom, individually and collectively. To add to what Christopher Goscha has already argued about these young people, I must underline the key role played by sports activities in the building of this new generation. The role of these sports-minded intellectuals has mostly been ignored in historical studies till date. However, these sportsmen were aware that winning a trophy had no immediate effect on the political situation: it was just a piece of evidence that many Vietnamese people were as skilled as the colonizers and it showed that the subjects could become as strong as their French masters.

This new elite wanted to make of use every opportunity for peaceful action to modernize the country, and many of them were keenly aware that it would be long and slow process. A minority, however, made the decision to take up arms because they felt that French domination no longer sufficed, and prevented the transformation of society as soon as desirable. As a result, since 1926 Cochinchina, Annam and Tonkin had experienced a prolonged period of unrest due to some sections of the local youth who could not wait for long-term political reforms. Most of them were students or had graduated from the Franco-Indigenous school system¹¹ and were protesting against French rule throughout the country: some demanded the right to vote, others insisted that the French must leave their country immediately. Sometimes they started their political action by playing football, as in Haiphong, where four pupils organized a protest in this way.¹²

In reality I found few examples of direct connection between football and Annamite nationalism. This can however be attributed to quite a few factors. First, because all Annamite social activities were under the strict vigilance of the Colonial Police, the ‘Sûreté coloniale’, the Annamite youth needed to be careful about what they said publicly, otherwise they could be sent to prison immediately. But in spite of this real threat, there is no reason to believe that football activities did not offer opportunities to discuss political issues in the colonial situation and plan political moves to change it. In fact, the training sessions or matches provided rare but ideal opportunities for such actions particularly because of the lack of mixed competitions between 1925 and 1932 in

Cochinchina and between 1929 and 1933 in Tonkin. Moreover, in that situation, they had few opportunities to show their national feelings as it could have been easier to do so during matches against French teams, as it was in Algeria,¹³ where matches were very violent and the crowds around the stadiums very aggressive.

It is somewhat surprising to note that many Annamite football clubs agreed to welcome French players and there was no aggression against them. In such context, it was almost impossible to think about the battle for independence in the presence of French citizens – otherwise the police might have been called. There was no overall anti-French impulse in Cochinchina; what existed was simply a state of rivalry with the French federation, which was not directed against the French community as a whole. There was evidence of a number of French journalists reporting a football match between two Annamite teams.¹⁴ For the presidents of these Annamite clubs, these French were friendly partners with whom they could build a new cultural space. It illustrates the fact that cross-community talks still existed despite the administrative autonomy of the Annamite football clubs. Compared to the football game in Oran studied by Didier Rey,¹⁵ this situation was genuinely original.

The administrative autonomy was a good deal for members of the Annamite elite because they were obliged to find new ways to govern their own clubs. This Annamite federation was therefore able to promote Vietnamese to positions of command, and for many years these leaders could do whatever they pleased in running the game, just as if the French had already left Cochinchina. Even though the main challenge was to collect funds to improve 'Star of Giadinh's standing as a symbol of independence, the Annamite community succeeded in doing so to a great extent. Despite what was written in some colonial newspapers, the local clubs managed to survive without the French federation and drew an increasingly numerous attendance in matches. It should be added that many spectators came to the stadium not only to attend a specific football game but also to support the team which resisted the colonizers.

The soccer crisis resulting from the exclusion of the Star of Giadinh was a precursor of a serious political crisis in Tonkin and Annam in 1929–1931. It may be argued that what happened in the world of football paved the way for this uprising, since football had awakened collective Annamite awareness¹⁶ and triggered off a radical change in the Annamite lifestyle.

Football and the radical nationalists

Let us try to understand and illustrate how the people who pushed for the radical thesis of expelling the French from Indochina became interested in football activities from 1928 onwards. Yet this sport was not used everywhere in Vietnam to promote this aim, as Luong Hy V. showed in the case of Tonkin.¹⁷

What did they do to turn football away from its sporting objectives?

First, I look at Haiphong (Tonkin) in 1927 where the Head of the 'École pratique d'industrie' excluded eleven students because of their anti-colonial feelings and their attempts to organize protests in Tonkin and Hanoi. Moreover, the police investigation showed that they belonged to one particular local sports club where they felt safe enough to promote political uprisings.¹⁸ This was not an isolated case in Indochina, where many Vietnamese people created football clubs. In normal times it was quite easy to establish a club; the only step was to seek authorization from the French administration. The latter used to conduct an investigation and normally give permission a few months later. But in 1928 in Tonkin, the French colonial residents reported that many associations were not waiting for this approval before starting their activities. All examples of such behaviour occurred in anti-colonial clubs.

The second example takes us to Cochinchina, Saigon to be precise, where the colonial police arrested Pham Van Dong in 1928. This young man secretly belonged to the Vietnamese Youth League created by Hồ Chí Minh in 1925¹⁹ in Canton, and played officially for 'Saigon sport'. He was

captured by the police while trying to create a Communist Party cell in this football club. Some weeks later, the colonial court sentenced him to Poulo Condor prison until 1936.²⁰

Next, in Toulouse (France), some Annamite students created their own football club called 'Sporting Annam'.²¹ 'Annam' meant Homeland for them, and undoubtedly these young people chose this name to support those who were fighting for independence. What did they actually do to achieve this? As they were too young to take up arms against France, they acted peacefully: each match was an opportunity to collect funds among Annamite supporters in France. This collected money was sent to Annam where adults used it for anti-colonial propaganda. Thus we can see that even in their free time, these pupils were occupied with their political project; although it would be an exaggeration to state that football field acted as a genuine preparation for war. What was right for boxing was not applicable to football in this 'Sporting Annam' club. That was probably why this club was never suppressed by the French authorities in the 1930 s.

Let us return to Indochina in the late 1920 s to discuss football's relations with politics. Communist propaganda was disseminated there among the Annamite labourers working on plantations in Cochinchina using football activities as a channel. These men used to play football on Sundays to keep fit, but some communist members used the opportunity to promote illegal political activities, as in Phu Rieng.²² In fact, every trip of the team enabled them to carry and distribute numerous clandestine documents supplied by Moscow or China. This kind of illegal action was also chosen by two Annamite schoolteachers in Annam in 1934. As the colonial police was aware of this method, they were captured and the other football club leaders were strictly monitored. It therefore became too dangerous for the communist members to operate in the same way. One solution was quickly identified by the communist party: it used travelling theatre companies to play football with the local peasants before their performance and seized the opportunity to talk about politics well outside the purview of the colonial police.

During the Popular Front period in Cochinchina a political movement of the far left called 'La Lutte' (The Struggle) tried to attract Vietnamese students by setting up football clubs, like the rival Communist party. Because that was how the latter succeeded in establishing its propaganda both in the countryside as also in the main cities such as Saigon and Hanoi, the members of 'La Lutte' did exactly the same thing and new football clubs sprang up illegally. Their key objective was to politicize the local youth, who joined the football clubs and completely ignored this underlying intention. In this case, football was a highly attractive bait to catch many non-politicized young students or workers. In his report the local French governor declared that these illegal sport clubs posed a great threat to peace in Cochinchina. It was quite difficult to identify the anti-colonial activities in the arena of football because there was no club composed entirely of anti-French members. Furthermore, unlike Algeria where the anti-colonial sporting clubs wore green jerseys because green was the colour of Islam, in Indochina such clubs did not select a single colour. It was quite impossible to wear a red jersey to demonstrate the membership of the communist party because the colonial police would have then arrested the entire team; that was why the red jersey was often chosen by colonial teams and never by anti-colonial ones.

What were the management's instructions?

We have heard from witnesses like Dang Van Viet that football was played only for pleasure. His captain, when he played at Hue or Hanoi, gave no specific advice or instructions before a match against a French team. A future North Vietnamese army colonel told us frequently that he had no recollection of hearing any political information when he was an active sportsman. I interviewed a few people who were involved with sporting activities in Vietnam during the 1930 s and all witnesses were intrigued by the question that was put to them: 'Were you determined to win a match when you played against a French team?' I posed this question many times to find out whether or not these ordinary sportsmen would have been enrolled in the Vietnamese Communist Party. Basically it seems not. It would appear that the Party created many cells in sports clubs but the

young sportsmen were not aware of this. All my witnesses said that playing football was purely a moment of real conviviality and never an anti-colonial struggle or preparation for war, even when they were playing against a French team. It seems that the Communist Party cells maintained a low profile in order to conduct their activity without attracting attention. That is why instructions from the management were not politicized. By acting in this way, these cells remained outside the scope of the colonial police till 1940 in Cochinchina and 1945 in North Tonkin. The behaviour of these young people was consistent with the recommendations that they could read in how-to guides to playing football: participants learned how to respect their opponents and the referee's decisions. All my witnesses' views pointed towards the same conclusion: for these young players, football was simply a game. This was very distinctive and entirely different from what happened in Reunion Island or Madagascar.²³

Was violence on the pitch a way to express anti-French feelings?

In the French colonial empire sporting violence was often employed as a means to express anti-French feelings. However, the first acts of violence in 1919 were interpreted by the colonial witnesses in terms of a lack of sporting culture and self-control on the part of the Annamite players. In addition, according to the same French people the Annamite spectators tried to push their team to be violent during inter-ethnic matches. At that time in Cochinchina the French leaders of the local sporting federation considered the possible advantage of welcoming some new players to strengthen the football teams. Breton agreed to this proposal only for a few French-educated Annamites in 1919. Workers or peasants, or anyone who might be violent or unable to respect 'fair play' because of their ignorance of the appropriate rules were never considered or welcomed.²⁴ Apparently the main problem came from the crowd in Saigon, who wanted to transform the game. According to Breton, it could turn to slaughter. He therefore recommended the Annamites to take part in a different championship in order to give them enough time to learn and internalize the rules of football.

In Tonkin, however, it appeared that some football matches might be violent because one of the opponents or both teams were very aggressive and would not hesitate to hurt a number of players in order to win the game. As a result, a football match sometimes became the opportunity to humiliate either the French or the Annamite players. As the Annamite people could not take up arms to fight the French authority, this occurred occasionally on the football field. In that case the worst situation would have been for the colonial power to see a French military team harassed by Annamite players. Because the crowd laughed at the French when they were hurt or when they lost a match, the military authorities could not send the entire crowd to prison in order to punish this kind of behaviour. It was probably obvious, however, that administrative sanctions alone could not prevent such happenings. One effective way of avoiding this risk was to ban the involvement of military teams in 1928 – the physical survival of French soldiers was thus guaranteed. The first consequence was that the local championship was devalued because the military teams, which were the best, took no part until 1933. The second effect was that the Annamite nationalists could not challenge the French colonial authority. The third conclusion was more positive for the nationalists because they played in their own competition without the teams that most distinctly embodied the detested colonization. A similar situation in Laos studied by Simon Creak had very different consequences.²⁵

Furthermore these types of violent on-field behaviour also affected the youth of Cochinchina where many football matches began to turn very violent. Here I refer to the rivalry between some Annamite players and other young *Metis* who belonged to a military school, the 'school for Saigonese troop children'. They hated each other and quite often came to blows. For many young Annamite people the *Metis* embodied what they hated most. As their fathers were either a French soldier or one of their parents was French, they were seen as enemies.²⁶ The French administration therefore had to face considerable social instability which was expressed in popular outbursts. The threat was genuine in the middle of the 1930s because matches between young teams continued to create disturbances. At the same time, the French administration was considering the creation of

a new schools' football competition in 1936 probably to foster brotherhood among young players. Many witnesses, who were students at the Franco-Annamite schools, have confirmed this hypothesis.

The last example of my study concerns the worst abuses I have ever found in the Vietnamese archives. It occurred in Hue (Annam) in April 1939 during a 'Robin Cup' match between Tonkin and Annam teams.²⁷ This one turned so violent that the 'Annam Sporting Federation' decided to suspend one of the Annamite players indefinitely; nine others were suspended for six months. Did they attack the other team because it included five French players? This could not be the case because the Frenchmen were unharmed at the end of the game whereas many of the Tonkin players were injured, some of them several times during the match. In this specific case it seems that the Annamites who played with French comrades were viewed as traitors by some of their own compatriots. The aggressors would not have dared to assault the French players but they did not hesitate to attack the Annamites as if the latter no longer belonged to the same country. It may be tempting to state that French colonization succeeded in dividing Vietnam into three parts which saw each other as rivals. In footballing activities, in fact, one can argue that the ruling principle was 'divide and rule'. However, all this may indicate the existence of an 'imagined community'²⁸ in Annam, because this act of violence was not committed against French people but against Vietnamese compatriots who betrayed this very community and were seen as enemies. The reaction of the Annam team can be compared with what happened in Algeria in the 1930 s.²⁹ Many matches in Oran were disrupted by fights organized by some young Muslim supporters who took the opportunity to express their nationalist feelings. But in Hue the crowd did not play the same role. The entire Annam team decided to hurt their Annamite opponents as an act of inverse retaliation. Whether this was prompted by any instructions from a political party is something which only future research will tell us.

Conclusion

It is important to note that initially some matches in Cochinchina provoked special feelings because the Annamite teams defeated the French ones. But these events were symbolic victories, mainly because the first Annamite players were French-educated and accepted French domination. Yet things began to change by 1925, when a large part of the local urban youth dared to challenge France. It was around this time that Vietnamese players and supporters recovered confidence in themselves thanks to the 'Star of Giadinh', and were no longer frightened of colonial prisons. Moreover, these sportsmen became models for the nation's youth.

Few Annamites made a link between football and politics but those who did became the new leaders because they were the first to suggest that this cultural activity was capable of unifying a nation around a football team better than the former monarchy which was completely subservient to the French power. Football was thus in one way both a leisure activity and a way to rebuild the Vietnamese nation. In 1939 in Annam it seemed that the game of football was an outlet through which to demonstrate the rejection of the colonial establishment. Politics and sports activities became increasingly intertwined in the 1930 s with new actors, such as the local youth or the Communist Party which used these activities as a way to introduce some anti-colonial propaganda.

Notes

1. *Le Courrier saigonais*, 19 January 1914, 4.
2. Gouvernement de Cochinchine, cabinet du Gouverneur. Revue de la presse en langue annamite du 16 au 31 mai 1927, Overseas Centre of Archives, Aix-en-Provence, FM 5 slotfom/39.
3. Goscha, *The Penguin History of Modern Vietnam*; Brocheux and Hémery, *Indochina, an ambiguous colonization, 1858–1954*; Raffin, *Youth mobilization in Vichy Indochina and Its Legacies, 1940–1970*, 11. The latter

points out that military personnel had encouraged the practice of occidental sports among the local population. See also Larcher-Goscha, *Du football au Vietnam, 1905–1949*.

4. Guillemot, 'Penser le nationalisme révolutionnaire au Vietnam'; Guillemot, *Dai Viet*; Brocheux, *Hô Chi Minh*; Cooper, *France in Indochina*.
5. Saada, *Les enfants de la colonie*.
6. *L'Echo annamite*, 27 January 1925, 4.
7. *Ibid.*, 29 January 1925, 1.
8. *L'Echo des sports indochinois*, 11 September 1925, 3.
9. Goscha, *The Penguin History of Modern Vietnam*, 137.
10. *Ibid.*, 111.
11. *Ibid.*, 135.
12. 'Incidents à l'école pratique d'industrie de Haiphong', Overseas centre of Archives, Aix-en-Provence, 51176.
13. Fates, 'Sport et politique en Algérie de la période coloniale à nous jours'.
14. *L'Echo annamite*, 10 June 1926, 1.
15. Rey, 'Le football en Oranie coloniale ou la guerre par d'autres moyens?'.
16. Simon Creak studied the same phenomenon in Laos in the 1930 s.
17. Hy V., *Revolution in the village*.
18. 'Incidents à l'école pratique d'industrie de Haiphong'.
19. Goscha, *The Penguin History of Modern Vietnam*, 148.
20. When he was released he continued to develop the Vietnamese Communist Party and become its leader after 1945.
21. 'Foyer des étudiants indochinois de Toulouse', Overseas centre of Archives, Aix-en-Provence, 3 slotfom/109.
22. Panthou, *Les plantations Michelin au Vietnam*, 226–27.
23. Combeau-Mari, *Sport et décolonisation*. See also 'Sociabilité sportive à Madagascar sous la colonisation française'.
24. *La Tribune Indigène*, 30 October 1919, 1.
25. Creak, *Embodied nation*, 3.
26. Saada, *Les enfants de la colonie*.
27. 'Dossier relatif à l'activité de sport en Annam, années 1930–1940', Dalat, National archives of Vietnam, 3591.
28. Hobsbawm, *Nations et nationalisme depuis 1780*, 264.
29. Rey, 'Le football en Oranie coloniale ou la guerre par d'autres moyens', 235.

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