Sino-Vietnamese Relations, Sino-US Relations and Regional Security

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Presentation to
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Outline

1. 13th National Party Congress
2. Sino-Vietnamese Relations
3. Sino-US Relations
4. Regional Security
1. Thirteenth National Party Congress
From Developing to Developed Country, 2021-2045

2025: developing country, modern industry, surpassing low middle income

2030: developing country, modern industry, high average income

2045: developed country with high income
Foreign Relations

• Independence, self-reliance, co-operation and development

• Handle properly and effectively relations with
  • neighbouring countries
  • major countries
  • strategic partners and
  • other partners
Proactive and Active International Integration

- Actively participate in building regional and global **multilateral institutions**
  - ASEAN
  - ASEAN-led institutions
  - United Nations
    - UN Security Council
    - UN Peace-Keeping South Sudan
  - Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
  - Mekong Sub-region cooperation
  - Multilateral Free Trade Agreements
Some Theoretical and Practical Issues About Socialism and the Path to Socialism in Viet Nam

“we must actively integrate into the world, implement a foreign policy of independence, self-reliance, peace, cooperation and development, and multilateralize and diversify international relations, on the basis of respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit”
17 Strategic and 12 Comprehensive Partnerships

South Korea, Spain, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, France, Malaysia, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand

*comprehensive partner
Future Forecast – Viet Nam

Four dangers becoming more severe:

1. Falling further behind economically (falling into the middle income trap)
2. Deviating from the socialist path
3. Corruption and mandarinism
4. Plot of peaceful evolution
2. Sino-Vietnamese Relations

- 1991 Normalisation of relations
- 2000 Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Cooperation in the New Century
- 2003 **vũa hợp tác, vũ đấu tranh** (Cooperation and Struggle)
  - **đối tác** (partner of cooperation)
  - **đối tượng** (object of struggle)
- 2008 – Strategic Partner/**Joint Steering Committee on Bilateral Relations**
- 2009 – Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
- 2013 – Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership
Positive Developments

• Cooperation between ministries and agencies, and exchanges between localities expanded

• “the management of border lines, boundary markers and border gates has been implemented well, while cross-border economic activities have been promoted despite the complicated developments of COVID-19 pandemic... Agreed to strengthen coordination in border management and protection...”
12th Joint Steering Committee for Bilateral Relations (video link, July 2020)

**Outstanding Issues**

- Vietnam’s trade deficit
- Slow progress on projects funded and managed by Chinese contractors
- Slow implementation of Chinese loans and non-refundable aid
- Trade: Vietnam pressed China to facilitate cross border trade, import more Vietnamese agricultural produce, and step up Chinese investment in hi-tech and environmentally friendly sectors in Vietnam
High-Level Contacts 2021

• President to President
  • Xi Jinping-Nguyen Xuan Phuc, telephone, May 24

• Prime Minister to Prime Minister
  • Pham Minh Chinh and Li Keqiang, phone, June 4

• Foreign Minister to Foreign Minister
  • Bui Thanh Son and Wang Yi, phone, April 16
  • Bui Thanh Son and Wang Yi, in person, June 8

• Minister to Minister (Public Security)
  • To Lam and Zhao Kezhi, in person Hanoi, February 19
    • 7th ministerial meeting cooperation against crime
    • Zhao also met Defence Minister Ngo Xuan Lich and VCP Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong
Military-to-Military Exchanges
April 23-24, 2021

• 6th Vietnam-China **Border Defence Friendship Exchange**
  • Quang Ninh and Guang Xi provinces
  • Co-chaired by Defence Ministers Sr. LTGEN Phan Van Giang and
    General Wei Fanghe

• 7th Vietnam-China **Defence Strategic Dialogue**
  • Co-chaired by Deputy Defence Ministers Hoang Xuan Chien and
    Shao Yuanming, held in Dongxing City

• Vietnam & China **Coast Guards** 1st joint patrol for 2021, Gulf
  of Tonkin delimitation line, 28 April

• 30th **Joint Naval Patrol** Gulf of Tonkin, 24-25 June
Other Exchanges 2021

• Joint Border Guard Patrols
  • Lao Cai Province-Honghe & Maguan, Hekou, 21 January
  • Dien Bien Province- Meng Kang Station, 21 May
  • Ha Giang Province and Yunnan, 21 June
  • Lao Cai Province-Hekou District, Yunnan, 25 June

• Vietnam-China Chiefs of Navy, online talk, 28 May

• Online symposium on Relations between CPV and CPC, June
  • Deputy party secretary level – Ho Chi Minh City & Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region
Viet Nam-China Working Groups

- Sea Area Beyond the Mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin
- Consultations on Cooperation for Mutual Development at Sea
- Cooperation in Less Sensitive Sea-related Areas
The East Sea (Biển Đông) Dispute

• 2009 – China’s Nine Dash Line
• 2011 Vietnam-China Agreement on Basic Principles Guiding the Settlement of Sea-Related Issues and Directions
• 2014 – Mega oil rig Hai Yang Shi You 981
• 2017-18 – Vanguard Bank/Repsol of Spain
• 2019 – Vanguard Bank and Red Orchid (Rosneft)
• 2021 Zarubezhneft acquires Rosneft’s two shareholdings, Block 06.1 and Block 05.3/11, and minority stake in the Nam Con Son pipeline
Vanguard Bank July – October 2019

Hai Yang Dizhi 8
survey ship

The HYDZ 8 Survey
July 3 - October 23, 2019
- HYDZ 8 path
- Chinese oil and gas blocks

Fiery Cross Reef
• 19th ASEAN-China Senior Officials Meeting on the Implementation of the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (SOM DOC)
  • Meeting held in Chongqing City
  • First meeting since 18th SOM COC, Da Lat, October 2019
  • Reactivate ASEAN-China Working Group on the Implementation of the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (SOM DOC)
  • Reach a Code of Conduct by 2022
COVID-19 Vaccine

• Early June Vietnam approved emergency use of Sinopharm
• China donates 500,000 Sinopharm vaccines, 20 June
• Vaccines to be used for:
  • Chinese citizens in Vietnam
  • Vietnamese who plan to work or study in China
  • People who live near the border
• Chinese Embassy presses Vietnam on Sinopharm “asap”
• Vietnam reliant on AstraZeneca vaccine
3. Sino-United States Relations
What Xi Jinping’s China Wants

Eight Key Goals*

1. Keep the Chinese Communist Party in power
2. National unity and territorial integrity (Uighur separatists, Hong Kong, Taiwan [and implicitly four shas])
3. Develop economy, avoid middle income trap
4. Environmental protection
5. First class military (peer to US)

*Source: international expert on China, under Chatham House Rules
What Xi Jinping’s China Wants

Eight Key Goals continued*

6. Push U.S. back from first island chain maritime zone security for second strike nuclear deterrent via SSBNs

7. Continental security – Belt and Road Initiative, grow markets, gravitational pull towards Beijing

8. International system with China at the centre, concentric sets of interests, shape rules based order

*Source: international expert on China, under Chatham House Rules
China’s Counter-Intervention Strategy

China has more than 1,250 ground launched ballistic and cruise missiles with range 500 to 5,500 km.

ICBM nuclear warheads to reach 200 in next 5 years.
Xi Jinping on the Communist Party of China 100th Anniversary

• “The Chinese people will absolutely not allow any foreign force to bully, oppress or enslave us and anyone who attempts to do so will face broken heads and bloodshed in front of the iron Great Wall of the 1.4 billion Chinese people.”

• “We must accelerate the modernization of national defence and the armed forces.”

• “We must take resolute action to utterly defeat any attempt to “Taiwan independence’…”
Biden Administration and China

• “China... has rapidly become more assertive. It is the only competitor potentially capable of combining economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.”

• Response: restore U.S. credibility and global leadership to ensure that “America, not China, sets the international agenda” working with allies and partners
  • *U.S. Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* (March 2021)
Biden Administration and China

Interim National Security Strategic Guidance

• “Revitalizing our core strengths is necessary but not sufficient.”

• When China behaves aggressively and coercively, and undermines rules and values of an open and stable international system “we will answer China’s challenge”

• “Strategic competition does not. and should not, preclude working with China when it is in our national interest...”
Regional Security – Vietnam’s Future Forecast

• Fierce competition among major powers, potentially volatile
• Disputes over territorial sovereignty, including islands and sea, growing tense and complicated
• Peace, stability, security, safety of navigation and overflight face great challenges and potential conflicts
• ASEAN facing many difficulties
  • *Political Report, 13th National Part Congress*
4. Regional Security

- U.S. has lost quantitative advantage and U.S. qualitative advantage was shrinking across several domains as People’s Liberation Army fields higher quality systems (2019)
- Greatest danger for U.S. is erosion of combat-credible conventional deterrence
- Without credible conventional deterrence China will be emboldened to undermine international order and our values for Free and Open Indo-Pacific
- Indo-Pacific Region remains priority theater for Department of Defense
  - U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Posture March 9, 2021
Combat-Credible Deterrence

• Agile and distributed Joint Force to deter and deny adversary’s objectives in 1st and 2nd island chain
• Regain positional advantage by balancing key capabilities across the Indo-Pacific Region
• Network of interoperable allies and partners willing and able to protect their sovereignty from coercion
• Reassure allies and partners of US capacity to conduct complex operations with capabilities that provide decisive advantage
Biden Administration and the Indo-Pacific

• U.S. will reinvigorate and modernize our alliances and partnerships around the world.
• Democratic alliances enable us to present a common front, unified position, pool our strength... to hold China to account.
• The U.S. will modernize alliances and partnerships with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea
• Vital national interests compel the deepest connection to the Indo-Pacific
• Engage partner nations India, Singapore, Vietnam
Conclusion

• Strategic competition between China and US will be the principal driver of change in the region
• China has given priority to modernizing its Southern Theater Fleet
• Chinese military modernization in the Indo-Pacific will continue to accelerate
  • Expanding cyber, space and electronic capabilities
• Grey zone coercive activities will continue
Conclusion

• Action-reaction cycle between Chinese and U.S. military forces will intensify
• Rules-based order will be contested
• Southeast Asian states will come under increased pressure to take sides
• As the military balance in the Indo-Pacific becomes more unfavorable to the U.S., there is a rising risk that China will become emboldened to alter the status quo – Taiwan
  • Period of concern: late 2020s and 2030s
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