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The Diplomat https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/the-policy-significance-of-trumps-asia-tour/
The Policy Significance of Trump’s Asia Tour
Unpacking Washington’s Asia-Pacific policy following the
president’s trip
By Roncevert Ganan Almond
In 1793, Lord Macartney traveled to Beijing on behalf of the British
Empire with the goal of opening Chinese trade. Famously, Emperor
Qianlong of the Qing Dynasty denied the commercial requests made on
behalf of King George III; instead, the Chinese leader, oblivious to the
shifting geopolitical landscape, treated the world’s most important
rising power as a tributary to the Celestial Court. The emperor could
not foresee the forthcoming Western ascendancy and the resulting
“Century of Humiliation.”
In contrast, U.S. President Donald Trump, leader of the world’s most
dominant nation, may feel flattered with the “state visit-plus”
reception he received in Beijing. Trump is the first foreign leader
since the founding of modern China in 1949 to have an official dinner
within the Forbidden City, the historic palace in Beijing that housed
Chinese emperors for almost half a millennium. Following his
consolidation of power during 19th Party Congress and with the rise of
China on the world stage, President Xi Jingping exuded a notable
confidence in extending this unprecedented reception to the U.S.
president, quite unlike the experience of Trump’s predecessor.
Of course, the efficacy of international diplomacy is not measured in
the length of the red carpet. Beyond the pomp
and protocol, Trump’s Asian tour was aimed at meeting three concrete
foreign policy goals: (1) strengthening U.S.-led efforts to deter and
isolate North Korea and its growing nuclear threat; (2) laying the
foundation for new bilateral trade relationships that reduce the U.S.
trade deficit; and (3) rolling out the administration’s vision for a
“free and open Indo-Pacific region.”
Given record low approval ratings, discord with Congressional
Republicans, and ongoing Russia-related investigations, the foreign trip
also provided an opportunity for the president to temporarily escape
domestic challenges and establish a fresh political narrative.
Assessing the president’s progress on each of these fronts will take
time. However, it is not too early to unpack key U.S. policy initiatives
following Trump’s marathon trip through Asia.
Stranger Things with North Korea
The most critical national security task of Trump’s trip was
strengthening U.S.-led efforts to stop Pyongyang’s ballistic missile
program and, ultimately, denuclearize North Korea.
Trump sought to deliver a clear message to North Korean leader Kim
Jong-un. In his remarks before South Korea’s National Assembly, the
president underscored the threat of military force: “History is filled
with discarded regimes that have foolishly tested America’s resolve.” He
noted that the U.S. had stationed three aircraft carriers nearby “loaded
to the maximum with magnificent F-35 and F-18 fighter jets” in addition
to appropriately positioned nuclear submarines. Subsequently, to
buttress Trump’s warning, the battle carrier groups of the USS Ronald
Reagan, Theodore Roosevelt and Nimitz carried out joint naval exercises
adjacent to the Korean peninsula. Each carrier strike group holds strike
fighter squadrons and a complement of maritime support, including a
cruiser, guided missile destroyers, and a nuclear attack submarine. U.S.
B-1 bombers also made an appearance. It was an extraordinary display of
force. Perhaps Trump was cognizant of the most consequential act in U.S.
relations with the Asia-Pacific: Commodore Matthew Perry’s conspicuously
display of American warfighting capacity in Tokyo harbor in 1853.
The president also sought to strengthen multilateral diplomacy to
isolate Pyongyang. For example, the aforementioned military maneuvers
advanced trilateral cooperation among Japan, U.S., and South Korea,
which Trump reaffirmed with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during his time in
Tokyo. During his trip, Trump also consistently called upon all
“responsible” nations to fully implement U.N. Security Council
resolutions, downgrade diplomatic relations with the regime, and sever
all ties of trade and technology. Whether his targeted audience – namely
Russia and China – will follow through is a separate question.
There is already tension on this issue.
As I noted during an interview with CGTN America, Security Council
Resolution 2375 and Resolution 2371, which targeted North Korea’s access
to energy resources, were not as extensive as Washington desired due to
the veto threats from Moscow and Beijing. China and Russia have
expressed opposition to any U.S. policy that results in a regime change,
regime collapse, accelerated reunification or military deployment north
of the thirty-eighth parallel (the so-called “four nos”). No doubt this
position and the perseverance of Kim Jong-un have frustrated Trump–a
frustration that is often expressed in bellicose terms, like his
well-known “Rocket Man” outburst at the United Nations General Assembly.
Indeed, an odd consistency of sorts has developed in Trump’s approach to
Kim: an exchange of playground taunts that would otherwise be amusing
but for the threat of nuclear war. In the most recent iteration,
responding to Kim’s latest salvo, Trump tweeted from Vietnam: “Why would
Kim Jong-un insult me by calling me ‘old,’ when I would NEVER call him
‘short and fat?’ Oh well, I try so hard to be his friend – and maybe
someday that will happen!” Perhaps only a dotard could forget the
president’s verbal assaults of his Republican challengers during the
2016 primary elections, some of whom are now supporting his agenda in
Washington. Can Trump and Kim similarly establish a working relationship
based on reciprocal insults? As the president acknowledged, with the
North Korean leader, stranger things can happen.
Zeroing in on the U.S. Trade
Deficit
Consistent with his campaign promise, on his first day in office, Trump
withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the “next generation”
regional free trade agreement that was the cornerstone of the Obama
administration’s Asia policy. As I noted in these pages, the risk with
Trump’s veto of the TPP was that there was no ready U.S. policy
substitute. During his tour, Trump provided his answer: the
establishment of new bilateral trade relationships in Asia that reduce
the U.S. trade deficit. As the president explained at the APEC CEO
Summit in Da Nang, Vietnam:
“I will make bilateral trade agreements with any Indo-Pacific nation
that wants to be our partner and that will abide by the principles of
fair and reciprocal trade. What we will no longer do is enter into large
agreements that tie our hands, surrender our sovereignty, and make
meaningful enforcement practically impossible.”
Additionally, he vowed to enforce World Trade Organization (WTO)
principles on protecting intellectual property and ensuring fair and
equal market access. This includes responding to countries that engage
in product dumping, subsidized goods, currency manipulation, and
predatory industrial policies.
To demonstrate the need for change, at each stop, the president
highlighted America’s trade deficit with the respective host country.
With China, for example, the U.S. goods and services trade deficit was
$309.6 billion in 2016. For this imbalance, Trump laid the blame at the
feet of his presidential predecessors, as opposed to the foreign states,
which, in his view, were effectively pursuing their self-interest. At
the same time, the president attacked countries, such as China, that he
said engaged in unfair trade practices in violation of world trade
rules. The Trump administration has launched investigations – such as
so-called “Section 232” investigations by the U.S. Department of
Commerce – targeting Chinese exports. If the U.S. were to impose
countervailing duties on Chinese products, some observers fear a trade
war.
Given the opportunity for reciprocal action,
it is not evident that Trump’s rhetoric and bilateral approach will
resolve structural issues regarding U.S. trade. As U.S. Secretary
of State Rex Tillerson noted, in the grand scheme of America’s large
trade deficits in Asia with countries like China, “the things that have
been achieved thus far are pretty small.” As a tacit admission to the
limitations of this approach, in Seoul, by omission, the Trump
administration effectively walked backed prior threats to nullify the
South Korea- U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS).
The Trump administration may also find that a piecemeal approach to
trade with Asia provides no greater leverage for U.S. exports or
strategic benefit for broader U.S. interests. Indeed, one of the
characteristics and advantages of being a superpower is the ability to
forge a multilateral consensus – to converge competing international
demands – in a framework that furthers the national interest.
Chinese-led initiatives such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP), which accounts for 40 percent of global trade and
covers three billion people across the region, and the Belts and Roads
Initiative, which has a similar international footprint, demonstrates
this type of ambition for global influence.
Additionally, achieving an absolute balance in trade with each of
America’s trading partners presents a false measurement of progress. As
Adam Smith and David Ricardo observed, international trade creates
mutual benefit by leveraging advantages, differentiation, and
specialization among trading partners. By focusing on a zero trade
deficit, the Trump administration may lose sight of the broader benefits
of trade and the global nature of modern supply chains. A more effective
course would entail strengthening the advantages of the United States,
such as its skilled workforce, innovative technology, and creative
energy.
In one sense, during his trip to Asia, Trump followed this track by
pushing large U.S. arms deals. For instance, in Japan, Trump promoted
the sale of ballistic missile defense technology; in South Korea, he
touted the acquisition of advanced military equipment, from fighter
aircraft to reconnaissance systems; in
Vietnam, he reportedly asked Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc why his
country was not buying more American military equipment. This
pattern follows a precedent established during Trump’s trip to Saudi
Arabia in May when his administration announced $110 billion worth of
purchases from U.S. defense companies. In search of commercial
deliverables, the president has turned to the United States’
unparalleled technological advantage in waging war.
Old and New Dreams in the
Indo-Pacific Region
Beyond the specifics of North Korea and trade policy, Trump introduced a
new American vision on a “free and open Indo-Pacific region” – otherwise
described by the president as an “Indo-Pacific dream.” As unveiled
during his tour of Asia, this regional concept contains both old and new
elements in U.S. foreign policy.
In terms of carryover from the Obama administration, for example, Trump
reaffirmed the strategic importance to the international community of
“free and open access” to the South China Sea, the importance of
“unimpeded” lawful commerce, the need to respect freedom of navigation
and over-flight, and other lawful uses of the sea. Similarly, Trump
confirmed U.S. treaty commitments to Japan, South Korea and the
Philippines, and re-affirmed the relatively new partnership with
Vietnam. He also continued Washington’s high-level dialogue with Beijing
on a range of pressing global challenges from cybersecurity to nuclear
proliferation. Specific policies like U.S. support for Japan’s permanent
seat on the Security Council went unchanged. He also largely continued
standard U.S. pronouncements on principles such as upholding the rule of
law.
The novel character of Trump’s foreign policy
towards Asia is found in his rhetoric, specifically concerning
sovereignty, nationalism, and “high-standard” rules of governance.
For example, at the APEC CEO Summit, the president embraced a “world of
strong, sovereign, and independent nations, thriving in peace and
commerce with others,” – an Indo-Pacific region consisting of “a
beautiful constellation of nations, each its own bright star, satellites
to none.” The unspoken message may be that the United States will
support individual Asian states against the increasingly gravitational
pull of China, a tacit rejection of any tribute system orbiting Beijing.
At the same time, in respecting the sovereignty and independence of
Asian states, the president rejected previous prescriptive normative
approach from Washington. Trump made a similar commitment at his speech
in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where he promised that “America will not seek
to impose our way of life on others.” There is a fear that Trump’s
attitude could be interpreted by authoritarian and autocratic regimes as
a green light to ignore democratic norms and violate human rights. In
other words, “America first” may mean that the United States is no
longer first in upholding the liberal world order.
Still riding the wave of nationalism that
swept him into the White House, at each stop, Trump celebrated a future
of “patriotism, prosperity, and pride.” For instance, the
president was careful to frame the respective achievements of each host
country as matters of national wonder, achievements born from freedom,
or at least the free market with regard to China. He did so most
dramatically in Seoul, when he distinguished the “miracle” of South
Korean freedom against the “tyranny” of North Korea, the thirty-eight
parallel representing the “thin line of civilization.”
Trump also began to articulate a concept of
“high-standard” or “high-quality” U.S.-sponsored rules or programs,
perhaps providing a contrast against presumably “lower” Chinese-led
efforts. In Tokyo, for instance, the president expressed support
for “high-standard rules of governance” and “high-quality United
States-Japanese infrastructure investment alternatives” in the
Indo-Pacific region. Later, in Vietnam, he called on the World Bank and
the Asian Development Bank to direct their efforts toward “high-quality
infrastructure investment” that promotes economic growth. Are these
remarks a subtle dig at “white elephant” projects under the Belts and
Roads Initiative and the RCEP, which does not include stronger
protections for labor, intellectual property, or foreign investment?
These remarks were likely intended for multiple audiences.
One target audience during Trump’s overseas
trip was U.S. voters and his political base in particular. The
president’s Indo-Pacific vision echoed traditional conservative domestic
themes like private sector-led initiatives, self-reliance, and
individual enterprise. Almost without fail, at each visit Trump
announced his claimed list of accomplishments in year one: a 3.2 percent
growth rate, record unemployment, an all-time high stock market, and the
defeat of the Islamic State (ISIS). In fact, Trump should receive credit
for remaining consistent to his campaign promise to revisit U.S. trade
relations and directly confront the challenge of North Korea’s nuclear
program, even if his style and approach are subject to scrutiny.
Trump has proven himself an adroit if unorthodox communicator. However,
the president’s message in Asia may have had difficulty spanning the
Pacific, as Trump continued to suffer political setbacks on the domestic
front, most evidently with Democratic electoral victories in Virginia
and New Jersey on Election Day, November 7. The “off-year” gubernatorial
races traditionally foretell the midterm Congressional elections
scheduled in 2018. If the Republicans lose control of the U.S. House of
Representatives next year, then we can expect a fresh round of
Congressional investigations and hearings to supplement the ongoing
Russia-related probes by special prosecutor Robert Mueller and others.
Following the election results, House Democrats have already introduced
articles of impeachment against the president.
As such, Trump’s five-nation tour likely provided a much-needed reprieve
from the “Swamp” in Washington, D.C. He could leave certain baggage at
home. Whether he can advance his objectives vis-à-vis North Korea, U.S.
trade deficits, and a new vision for the Indo-Pacific region remains to
be seen. Following the president’s visit, we can at least unpack and
begin to measure his foreign policy in Asia.
Roncevert Ganan Almond
is a Partner and Vice-President at The Wicks Group, based in Washington,
D.C. He has counseled government authorities in Asia, Europe, the Middle
East, Africa, and Latin America on issues of international law. He
served as an aide to Hillary Clinton’s 2008 presidential campaign, but
is not currently affiliated with any campaign. The views expressed here
are strictly his own. |